

DD/I Notice
No. 60-100-1

DD/I N 60-100-1
1 December 1961

LIAISON WITH DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)

25X1A

Reference: CIA [REDACTED] (1 April 61)

1. The following OCR personnel have been officially accredited as CIA Liaison Officers to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA):

25X1A	Name	Component	Room	Telephone
	[REDACTED]	Liaison Staff, CR	2E45	5606, 6317
	[REDACTED]	Liaison Staff, CR	2E45	5606, 6317
	[REDACTED]	Liaison Staff, CR	2E45	5606, 6317

2. The above named Liaison Officers will represent the Agency at the working level in the coordination of intelligence collection requirements initiated within CIA and also act as a focal point for the processing of collection requirements served on the Agency by DIA intelligence components. Other matters involving interagency support should be coordinated through this established liaison channel.

[REDACTED] 25X1A

ROBERT ANDY, JR.
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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3 March 1971

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Guidelines for Release of CIA Finished Intelligence
[REDACTED]

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General

1. Within the overall concern for the security of sources and methods of U.S. intelligence, the policy for the release of intelligence [REDACTED] is based on two factors. The first is that by government-to-government agreements, the U.S. has an obligation to furnish [REDACTED] with intelligence on certain subjects and areas. The second principle is that intelligence, over and above that called for in the above agreements, will not be released unless there is a clear and definable benefit to the U.S. which is likely to be gained by such release. This benefit may take several forms: e.g., to encourage [REDACTED] to the U.S. or to provide [REDACTED] with information which might influence a policy decision or action on their part favorable to the U.S. on a pending issue. Obviously application of the second principle will require flexibility and forethought.

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2. An item of intelligence should be released [REDACTED] only once. An example would be the case of a topic covered by a Weekly Review article and released [REDACTED]. If this article is expanded to an Intelligence Memorandum, it should not be released unless it contains significant additional intelligence. No special efforts should be made to sanitize material for release [REDACTED] unless there is a clear benefit to the U.S.

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Specific Guidelines

3. The Deputy Director for Intelligence has determined that current intelligence items [REDACTED] and related topics) appearing in the Central Intelligence

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* The United States Intelligence Board, following the guidelines and procedures set forth in USIB-D-17.1/25 of 14 March 1968, determines the release or nonrelease of National Intelligence Estimates.

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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Bulletin (white and red versions only) and the Weekly Review and Summary may be passed [REDACTED] All other intelligence production is subject to the following rules.

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4. In accordance with government-to-government agreements, the following may be passed [REDACTED]

a. Finished intelligence on the USSR, Communist china, Eastern Europe, Mongolia, and North Korea. [REDACTED]

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b. Finished intelligence on subversive activities undertaken by the Soviet Bloc and Communist China in less developed countries. [REDACTED]

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5. Because of the actual or potential net benefit to the U.S., finished intelligence on certain subjects of current interest may be released [REDACTED] Subjects which presently fall in this category are:

a. Cuba and Cuban subversive activities in Latin America

b. [REDACTED]

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The above listing is subject to change by authority of the Deputy Director for Intelligence in the light of emerging situations and of evidences of [REDACTED] cooperation or non-cooperation.

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6. Except as it might fall into one of the categories in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 above, finished intelligence on the following areas will be released [REDACTED] only by authority of the Deputy Director for Intelligence:

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a. Latin America

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b. Africa

c. [REDACTED]

d. Middle East

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e. South and Southeast Asia

f. [REDACTED]

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7. [REDACTED] will continue to be invited to the

[REDACTED] conducted by the Office of Current Intelligence. The content of these briefings will remain generally unchanged; briefings on Vietnam and related topics will not be given in this forum. Other oral briefings of

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[REDACTED] should generally follow the guidelines set forth in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above. In the case of requests [REDACTED] for informal oral briefings on specific subjects or situations (other than those related to Vietnam) a greater latitude is permissible, particularly if a reasonable justification is presented with the request. Office directors are authorized to exercise their own discretion in these cases; questionable or doubtful cases may be referred to the Deputy Director for Intelligence for decision. Commenting on [REDACTED] may continue.

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[REDACTED] (Vuegraphs, briefing materials, etc.) relating to the USSR, European satellites, Communist China, Mongolia, and North Korea may be released [REDACTED] Materials relating to other areas may not be released. The above guidelines are applicable also to oral briefings and discussions on photo-interpretation findings and activities.

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[REDACTED]
EDWARD W. PROCTOR

Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence

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DDI NOTICE
NO. 60-2

DDI N 60-2
27 April 1977

VISITS TO U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND OFFICES

1. There have been instances when DDI officers have arranged or attempted to arrange visits to military installations or offices in the United States through direct contact with the activities to be visited. While it is recognized that in many instances visits by CIA personnel are made at the request of officials of the military services and the requestors assure that the visit arrangements will be properly processed, such has not always been the case.

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2. The Department of Defense and the military services have an established formal system for the purpose of handling and controlling military support for CIA. [REDACTED] is in daily liaison with the military system and, even though [REDACTED] is rarely involved in the visits within the continental U.S., [REDACTED] stands ready to assist DDI officers in making visit arrangements using the approved liaison channels.

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3. Requests to military installations and offices in the continental U.S. should be directed in writing to [REDACTED]. The request should include the installation to be visited, the name(s) of the person(s) visiting, the name(s) of the person(s) to be visited, the date(s) of the visit, the purpose of the visit and any other pertinent information.

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[REDACTED]
Paul V. Walsh /
Acting Deputy Director
for Intelligence

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